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2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Syria’s conflict now confronts the United States with a crucial moment. Only two areas of the country remain out of the control of the Bashar al-Assad regime, and the United States main-
tains a military presence in both. Further territorial 
gains by the regime and its key allies, Russia and Iran, 
pose the risk of direct confrontation with the United 
States. In response, after years in which the United 
States pursued a policy of disengagement on Syria, the 
Donald Trump administration is now changing course. 
It hopes to use the presence of US forces to regain 
leverage to shape the closing phases of the conflict 
and influence the path of any potential political settle-
ment. It has identified three ambitious aims for its pol-
icy in Syria: to reduce Iran’s presence and influence, to 
defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and 
prevent its resurgence, and to achieve an “irreversible” 
political transition in Syria. 
As this policy takes shape, however, the administration 
has weakened a core pillar of leverage: the US role in sta-
bilization and reconstruction in eastern Syria. The Trump 
administration has adopted a minimalist approach to 
stabilization in eastern Syria, eliminating $200 million 
in funding for stabilization programs. Such an approach 
is deeply counterproductive. It conflicts with current 
US stabilization doctrine, undermines topline US policy 
aims, and contributes to conditions on the ground that 
support the resurgence of violent extremism. 
To improve its odds of success in Syria, the United 
States will need to adopt a broader approach to sta-
bilization, and fund it accordingly. Such an approach 
requires that strengthening human security in US areas 
1 US Department of State, “Briefing on Syria Meeting and U.S. Strategy,” September 27, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2018/09/286289.htm.
2 “By, with, and through” military doctrine refers to operations conducted by partners, combined with US forces, in the context of 
unconventional warfare. For background on the doctrine in the context of Syria, see Linda Robinson, “SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, 
With, and Through’ Local Forces,” Cipher Brief, May 9, 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/sofs-evolving-role-
warfare-by-with-and-through-local-forces. 
of operation be defined as the principal objective of US 
stabilization operations. To make this shift, the United 
States will need to bring its stabilization operations in 
Syria into line with current US doctrine, which empha-
sizes the importance of supporting locally legitimate 
political institutions able to provide effective gover-
nance and ensure local security.1 
Such a shift will not be simple, or straightforward. It will 
require significant changes in how the United States 
operates on the ground in eastern Syria, notably with 
regard to its partnership with the Kurdish-led Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF). Rather than delegate au-
thority over local governance of Arab-majority areas to 
the SDF—which has governed in a heavy-handed fash-
ion, fueling local grievances—the United States needs 
to adopt a broader view of what it means to work “by, 
with, and through” local actors, and transfer gover-
nance from the SDF to locally legitimate authorities.2 
The use of stabilization efforts to strengthen local 
governance offers the potential for important gains, 
both for residents of eastern Syria and for US policy. In 
the short term, it would strengthen the US position in 
eastern Syria, provide a more robust basis for pursuing 
topline US policy goals, and mitigate local grievances 
that contribute to future radicalization. In the longer 
term, it would provide local communities with more 
representative political institutions, reduce incentives 
for local elites to collaborate with the Assad regime as 
a counterweight to the SDF, and equip communities to 
more effectively navigate the eventual reimposition of 
regime control over Syria’s eastern province by creat-
ing conditions favorable to enhanced local autonomy. 
OVERVIEW
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With the fall of southern Syria to the Assad regime in July 2018, Syria’s eight-year conflict has entered a new phase. The regime’s gains in the south represent 
more than just another notch in Assad’s victory belt. 
They left only two remaining areas of the country out-
side the regime’s control: a zone in northwest Syria—
where Turkey has established a military presence with 
its “Euphrates Shield” and “Olive Branch” operations, 
and where the United States has small, but strategi-
cally important, positions in the town of Manbij—and 
a zone running across northeast and eastern Syria in 
the provinces of Hasaka, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzour, from 
which the United States conducts most of its opera-
tions against ISIS.3 Therefore, for the first time since the 
onset of armed conflict, any further regime advances 
risk direct confrontation with US and Turkish forces.4 
The next phases of the conflict, and the terms of a pos-
sible political settlement including the future integrity 
of the Syrian state, are now directly connected to what 
the United States does on the ground, and whether 
it effectively uses its presence to advance its larger 
diplomatic and political aims. Recent developments 
have raised the stakes of the US presence in Syria, but 
have also increased the potential risks of uncertainty 
about the purposes of its role, its intentions, and its 
longer-term goals. 
Such uncertainty has been a hallmark of US engage-
ment in Syria since 2011. From the beginning of the 
conflict, US policy has been marred by ambiguity, and 
a sharp disconnect between its stated objectives and 
the resources allocated to achieve them. Under the 
Trump administration, this uncertainty has deepened. 
The aims of US engagement in Syria have expanded, 
3 For a map of locations of US forces as of spring 2018, see Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Jeremy White, and David Bott, “The U.S. Has Troops in 
Syria. So Do the Russians and Iranians. Here’s Where,” New York Times, April 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/11/
world/middleeast/syria-military-us-russia-iran.html.
4 Catherine Harris with Jennifer Cafarella, “Update: Pro-Regime Forces Setting Conditions to Attack U.S. Forces in Eastern Syria,” 
Institute for the Study of War, August 31, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/08/update-pro-regime-forces-setting.html.
5 Elise Labott, “US Envoy to Syria Says US Will Stay Until There is an ‘Enduring Defeat’ of ISIS,” CNN, September 7, 2018, https://www.cnn.
com/2018/09/06/politics/us-envoy-syria-enduring-defeat/index.html; Karen DeYoung and Shane Harris, “Trump Instructs Military to 
Begin Planning for Withdrawal from Syria,” Washington Post, April 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
trump-instructs-military-to-begin-planning-for-withdrawal-from-syria/2018/04/04/1039f420-3811-11e8-8fd2-49fe3c675a89_story.
html?utm_term=.1c4bcb993086; Tim Haines, “Defense Secretary Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dunford Press 
Briefing,” RealClearPolitics, August 28, 2018, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/08/28/defense_secretary_mattis_and_
chairman_of_the_joint_chiefs_of_staff_dunford_press_briefing.html. 
6 Emily Burchfield, “Has the US Given Up on Stabilization Efforts in Syria?” Syria Source (blog), Atlantic Council, September 10, 2018, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/has-the-us-given-up-stabilization-efforts-in-syria. 
yet statements from officials have sown confusion 
about every aspect of US strategy. The administra-
tion’s goals now include not only defeating ISIS and 
stabilizing areas it once held to prevent its return—
the core objectives of the US presence in Syria since 
2015—but also achieving an irreversible political tran-
sition and reducing Iran’s presence and influence in 
the country. 
How the United States intends to achieve these goals, 
however, is as murky today as it was throughout the 
Barack Obama administration. Despite recent indica-
tions that the United States is no longer planning a 
rapid pullout from Syria, its commitment to maintain-
ing a troop presence remains uncertain, thrown into 
doubt by the president’s interest in a rapid end to 
the deployment.5 The role of US forces in rolling back 
Iranian influence is also undefined, as is the strategy 
through which the United States will pursue a politi-
cal transition, and how US forces on the ground will 
advance this aim. And, while the stabilization of areas 
once held by ISIS is a key priority, funding allocated 
to the State Department to support stabilization pro-
grams has been eliminated.6 Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, and European governments are now 
filling the gap. This uncertainty and incoherence have 
already imposed significant costs on the United States, 
eroding partnerships with local actors and weakening 
US credibility with key Syrian, European, and regional 
partners. Observers might be forgiven for wondering 
what, precisely, the United States is up to in Syria, and 
how these pieces fit together to advance a coherent 
set of overarching objectives. With the Assad regime’s 
recent advances, moreover, conditions on the ground 
now demand clarity about the Trump administration’s 
aims and priorities in Syria. 
SYRIA’S ENDGAME AND US 
STABILIZATION OPERATIONS
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US Policy and the Role of Stabilization in 
Eastern Syria
Questions about where stabilization in eastern Syria 
fits in the larger scheme of US policy loom especially 
large. With the collapse of ISIS, stabilization efforts 
have emerged as a main pillar of US operations in 
eastern Syria.7 Yet, even as it becomes a centerpiece 
of an ambitious US policy, stabilization has been 
framed in the narrowest possible terms, and organized 
along lines that signal the limits of US engagement. 
7 US Embassy in Syria, “Briefing on the Status of Syria Stabilization Assistance and Ongoing Efforts To Achieve an Enduring Defeat of 
ISIS,” August 17, 2018, https://sy.usembassy.gov/briefing-on-the-status-of-syria-stabilization-assistance-and-ongoing-efforts-to-achieve-
an-enduring-defeat-of-isis/.
Stabilization is presented as an explicit alternative to 
larger-scale, and more costly, reconstruction efforts, or 
to activities that might be seen as implying an indefi-
nite US presence in the country. These include support 
for the development of local governance institutions 
in Arab-majority areas of eastern Syria—as opposed 
to institutions dominated by the Kurdish-led SDF—or 
the parallel development of locally controlled security 
and justice sectors in such areas. Emphasizing the lim-
its of US engagement, Brett McGurk, US special envoy 
to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, has stressed 
Hasaka
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that “[s]tabilization is not nation-building. We’re not 
attempting to dictate political outcomes nor is it long-
term reconstruction where projects are chosen by out-
siders often with no connection to the local community 
costing and often wasting billions of dollars. Instead, 
stabilization is a low-cost, sustainable, citizen-driven 
effort to identify the key projects that are essential to 
returning people to their homes such as water pumps, 
electricity nodes, grain silos, and local security struc-
tures, local police.”8 
McGurk’s caution about the use and abuse of recon-
struction is not inappropriate. The US track record 
in post-conflict reconstruction is sufficient to give 
any informed observer pause; the experiences in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are reason enough to be leery. 
Nonetheless, the current, rigidly defined, and tightly 
constrained US approach to stabilization is deeply 
problematic. In so sharply limiting the scope of its ac-
tivities, the Trump administration is reproducing the 
defining flaw of US Syria policy since 2011: aspirational 
aims with inadequate resources. Whether the main 
purpose of stabilization is to improve the conditions 
that promote radicalization and stem the resurgence 
of ISIS, or to advance the goals of a political transi-
tion and a reduction in Iran’s influence, a more flex-
ible, locally driven, and better-funded approach will 
be needed. 
A renewal of funding for stabilization is essential for 
the United States to achieve its aims in eastern Syria; 
however, the principal shortcomings of the policy are 
not budgetary. With its current approach, the United 
States is missing an opportunity to use both stabili-
zation and reconstruction more effectively, in two 
critical ways. First, the current approach fails by not 
using stabilization programs as a means to strengthen 
8 US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Mattis, General Dunford and Special Envoy McGurk on 
the Campaign to Defeat ISIS in the Pentagon Press Briefing Room,” May 19, 2017, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/1188225/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretarymattis-general-dunford-and-sp/.
9 US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Agency for International Development, press release, “Stabilization Assistance 
Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas,” June 19, 2018, 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283334.htm.
human security in US areas of operation, neglecting 
the opportunity to assist in developing governance 
frameworks that protect civilians rather than threaten 
them. In delegating local governance in eastern Syria 
to a Kurdish-led force, the Syrian Democratic Forces—
and in its reluctance to use stabilization to support the 
development of locally legitimate governance bodies 
in Arab-majority areas—the United States is increas-
ing the likelihood of a political future in which citizens 
remain vulnerable to the authority of unjust, abusive 
state institutions. 
Second, current stabilization strategy fails to advance 
the larger diplomatic and strategic purposes of US 
policy, particularly its commitment to an “irreversible 
political transition” in Syria. Even in the context of a 
limited time horizon for US forces, much can be done 
to expand possibilities for meaningful decentralization 
in Syria—a plausible element of what a Syrian political 
transition might entail—by enabling local communi-
ties in areas of US operations to navigate the eventual 
departure of US forces, and the likely restoration of 
the Assad regime as the sovereign authority in eastern 
and northeastern provinces. Overcoming these issues, 
however, requires: greater clarity about the US com-
mitment to maintaining its presence in eastern Syria; 
a stabilization strategy that more directly addresses 
the concerns of Arab-majority communities; a more 
flexible use of the “by, with, and through,” strategy the 
United States has adopted in these areas; and a willing-
ness to invest the resources such a strategy will require. 
The initial step toward such a strategy demands noth-
ing more than applying the US government’s defi-
nition of stabilization. The Stabilization Assistance 
Review (SAR)—a major assessment and updating of 
stabilization doctrine, released in June 2018—defined 
stabilization as “an inherently political endeavor that 
requires aligning U.S. Government efforts—diplomatic 
engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—toward 
supporting locally legitimate authorities and systems 
to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.”9 
This emphasis on the political character of stabilization 
does not mean “dictating political outcomes.” Rather, 
it acknowledges that stabilization cannot be detached 
from issues of governance, the effectiveness of polit-
ical institutions, and the quality of relations between 
citizens and legitimate local authorities. It recognizes 
that effective stabilization requires functioning justice 
“ A renewal of funding for 
stabilization is essential for the 
United States to achieve its 
aims in eastern Syria; however, 
the principal shortcomings of 
the policy are not budgetary.”
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The conflict has killed more than 470,000 Syrians, the last comprehensive 
number accepted internationally. Of note that this number was issued 
in 2016, and since then most international monitoring groups have 
essentially stopped counting.1
UN ESCWA concluded that the 
volume of destruction of Syria’s 
physical capital and its sectoral 
distribution exceeds $388 billion.5
6.1 million children and adolescents 
are in need of education 
assistance, including 1.75 million 
children who dropped out of 
school.8
5.5 million Syrians remain food 
insecure and require some form of 
food assistance.6
Unemployment rate is estimated 
at about 50%, and is the main 
concern internally displaced 
Syrians list as a constraint to 
returns.7
Over 11 million Syrians have 
been displaced internally or 
made refugees, half the pre-war 
population.2, 3
From 2011 to 2016, cumulative GDP 
loss is estimated at $226 billion.4
1 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-death-toll.html 
2 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66538
3 http://www.unhcr.org/sy/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/02/Syria-Fact-Sheet-2017-2018.pdf 
4 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview
5 https://www.unescwa.org/news/syrian-experts-discuss-post-conflict-reconstruction-policies-after-political-agreement-syria 
6 https://www.wfp.org/content/syrian-arab-republic-faowfp-crop-and-food-security-assessment-mission-october-2018
7 https://www.wfp.org/content/syrian-arab-republic-faowfp-crop-and-food-security-assessment-mission-october-2018
8 http://www.unhcr.org/sy/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/06/UNHCR-Syrias-End-of-Year-Report-2017.pdf
The Humanitarian/Economic 
Toll of the Syrian Conflict
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institutions and security frameworks that local com-
munities view as legitimate; without which, “managing 
conflict” cannot happen. It also makes clear that stabi-
lization cannot be detached from subsequent phases 
of post-conflict recovery, including reconstruction, and 
that how stabilization is managed in the near term has 
long-term consequences for the stability and security 
of local communities. 
A second critical step is similarly straightforward, yet 
no less challenging: avoid repeating past mistakes in 
the design and implementation of stabilization pro-
grams.10 By linking stabilization to an integrated Syria 
strategy, the United States can reduce the likelihood 
of reproducing the disconnect between its top-down 
diplomatic and strategic efforts and its field-based op-
erations, which became a hallmark of US programs in 
Idlib and other opposition-held areas in the northwest.11 
With little clarity about the aims of US policy in Syria 
and a lack of coherence in its engagement with the 
opposition, field operations evolved in response to ur-
gent needs among civilian populations, but with little 
relation to an overarching policy. 
These two steps would require significant changes in 
how the United States undertakes stabilization oper-
ations in Syria. Yet, they offer an opportunity for sta-
bilization to advance broader policy objectives. These 
10 Critical assessments of US stabilization efforts in Syria highlight significant deficiencies, and are consistent in identifying the integration 
of stabilization into coherent, integrated diplomatic and strategic frameworks as essential to the success of both. See Frances Z. Brown, 
“Seeing Like a State-builder: Replication of Donor Reconstruction Dilemmas in Syria,” The Politics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
(Washington, DC: Project on Middle East Political Science, 2018), https://pomeps.org/2018/09/07/pomeps-studies-30-the-politics-of-
post-conflict-reconstruction/; Matt Freear, Syria Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: American Security Project, 2016), 
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/white-paper-syrian-stabilization-and-reconstruction/; Mona Yacoubian, Lessons Learned for 
Stabilization in Syria (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2014), https://www.stimson.org/content/lessons-learned-stabilization-syria-2; and 
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Stability Operations in Syria: The Need for a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs,” Military Review, May-June, 2017, 
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2017/Stability-Operations-in-Syria/. 
11 Frances Z. Brown, Dilemmas of Stabilization Assistance: The Case of Syria (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/26/dilemmas-of-stabilization-assistance-case-of-syria-pub-77574; Melissa Dalton 
and Frances Z. Brown, “Don’t Give Up Yet: There’s Still a Chance to Salvage Eastern Syria,” CSIS Briefs (blog), Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, August 9, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dont-give-yet-theres-still-chance-salvage-eastern-syria. 
12 Hassan Hassan, “ISIS is Ready for a Resurgence,” Atlantic, August 26, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/
baghdadi-recording-iraq-syria-terrorism/568471/. 
include preventing the resurgence of post-Caliphate 
ISIS, an outcome that remains in doubt. They also in-
clude building local capacity for, and putting the foun-
dations in place for, a decentralized political framework 
that could become a critical piece of the larger political 
transition the United States still hopes to see in Syria, 
and ease the eventual reintegration of eastern prov-
inces into the Syrian state.12 As currently configured, 
US stabilization efforts in the Jazirah are poorly de-
signed to play this role. Rather than integrate stabiliza-
tion into topline diplomacy, the United States limits the 
scope of its engagement, rejects potential initiatives 
that might be viewed as support for reconstruction—or, 
even worse, nation building—and outsources even the 
modest costs of small-scale stabilization programs to 
other members of the anti-ISIS coalition, further cur-
tailing its influence on the ground. The US approach 
has seemingly been constructed with one eye on the 
political winds blowing from the Trump White House 
and the other on the likelihood that the time horizon 
of the US presence in Syria will be limited, and will al-
most inevitably be followed by the forced reintegration 
of Syria’s eastern provinces into a unitary Syrian state 
under the Assad regime’s control. 
Such an approach is short-sighted and counterproduc-
tive. It virtually guarantees the failure of both the short-
term objectives that define the current approach to 
stabilization, and the longer-term aims of US policy. As 
designed, US efforts will do little to address, and may 
well contribute to, conditions that will facilitate the re-
turn of ISIS in a new form. They will exacerbate dysfunc-
tional patterns of local governance that have taken hold 
in areas under US control, where the SDF governs as 
the implementing arm of the Kurdish Democratic Union 
Party (PYD). They will also encourage attempts by the 
Assad regime to disrupt stability in areas of US opera-
tions, and erode prospects that local actors in the eastern 
provinces will be able to shape the terms of their even-
tual reintegration into a regime-dominated Syrian state. 
“ A second critical step is 
similarly straightforward, yet 
no less challenging: avoid 
repeating past mistakes in the 
design and implementation of 
stabilization programs.”
Rethinking Stabilization in Eastern Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework
8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Legacies of the Past and the Shadow of the 
Future 
Two critical factors set the stage for these outcomes; 
neither can be addressed by the current US approach to 
stabilization. The first concerns legacies of the past: the 
impact of the Syrian conflict on longstanding patterns 
of governance and intercommunal relations in Syria’s 
east. In these thinly populated and overwhelmingly ag-
ricultural areas, local security, state-society relations, 
and intercommunal relations—including often-fraught 
ties between Kurdish and Arab communities—were 
The European Union and member 
states have provided 3.4 billion 
euros in non-humanitarian aid.3
After redirecting $230 million 
in stabilization funds for Syria 
to other policy priorities, the US 
elicited around $300 million in 
contributions from other countries.
Countries in the region have stepped 
up burden-sharing, with Saudi 
Arabia contributing $100 million and 
the UAE contributing $50 million to 
US-led stabilization efforts.4
However, Western countries 
are withholding funds for 
reconstruction until a political 
transition occurs.5 
Since 2011, the United States 
and other Western donors have 
provided over $1 billion in politically 
oriented assistance to local 
councils in opposition-held areas.1
The US has provided $900 million 
in non-lethal and stabilization 
assistance to Syria.2
Syrian Conflict Stabilization/
Early Recovery Funding
1 https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/26/dilemmas-of-stabilization-assistance-case-of-syria-pub-77574 
2 https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/isp-i-18-29.pdf 
3 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/22664/eu-and-crisis-syria_en 
4 https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/285198.htm
5 https://apnews.com/6fa0762530274c48937817d77a10c7e8
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heavily mediated by tribal authorities.13 Since 2011, 
however, prewar governance frameworks have been 
upended. Tribal identities vary enormously in the ex-
tent to which they influence behavior and political loy-
alties.14 Nonetheless, as protests escalated across Syria 
in 2011, the affinities and standing of tribal elders have 
been sharply eroded as the communities splintered 
among pro-regime loyalists—often drawn from tribal 
elites who benefitted from their ties to the regime—and 
supporters of the opposition who were concentrated 
among younger, better-educated segments of local 
populations. 
Both the regime and the opposition have sought to 
mobilize tribes to strengthen their positions in the 
Jazirah region in Syria’s northeast. The Assad regime 
appointed loyalist tribal leaders to key positions, es-
tablished pro-regime tribal militias, and exploited long-
standing patronage networks to enlist the support of 
tribes. In parallel, the opposition cultivated anti-re-
gime elites, supported the emergence of anti-regime 
tribal militias, and worked to unify supportive tribes 
through events such as the Conference of Arab Tribes 
in Istanbul and Cairo.15 In December 2017, pro-opposi-
tion tribal leaders met in Istanbul for the first general 
conference of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes, 
followed by conferences of opposition representa-
tives in Aleppo and Idlib.16 Urban areas where protests 
were most intense, such as the Baba Amr district of 
Homs, were home to large tribal networks as a result 
of decades of rural-urban migration. As these residents 
13 Dawn Chatty, “The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control,” Middle East Journal vol. 64 no. 
1, Winter 2010, pp. 29-49, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20622981?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. See also Akil Hussein, “Division 
Defines Syria’s Tribes and Clans,” Chatham House, January 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/division-defines-syrias-tribes-
and-clans; Andrew Tabler (ed.), “Eying Raqqa: A Tale of Four Tribes” Policy Note 38 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, 2017), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/eyeing-raqqa-a-tale-of-four-tribes; and Andrew Table (ed.), 
“A Tale of Six Tribes: Securing the Middle Euphrates River Valley” Policy Note 52 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 2018), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-tale-of-six-tribes-securing-the-middle-euphrates-river-valley. 
14 On the use and abuse of tribes and tribalism as frameworks for understanding social and political dynamics in eastern Syria, and on 
relations between local actors in Raqaa province and the Assad regime, see Annika Rabo, “Regional Politics and Shawai`a Identities in 
the Raqaa Province,” unpublished manuscript presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting, 2017.
15 The Assad regime has also constituted tribal conferences, militias, and other groupings. On pro-regime tribal militias, see Aymenn 
Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Quwat Muqatili al-Asha’ir: Tribal Auxiliary Forces of the Military Intelligence,” Pundicity (blog), April 2, 2017, http://
www.aymennjawad.org/19789/quwat-muqatili-al-ashair-tribal-auxiliary-forces; Haian Dukhan “Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian 
Revolution,” openDemocracy, December 19, 2012, https://www.opendemocracy.net/haian-dukhan/tribes-and-tribalism-in-syrian-
revolution; and Haian Dukhan, “The Syrian Civil War: What Role do Tribal Loyalties Play?” Middle East Centre Blog, London School of 
Economics, June 13, 2018, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/07/13/the-syrian-civil-war-what-role-do-tribal-loyalties-play/. 
16 Akil Hussain, “Analysis: Division Defines Syria’s Tribes and Clans,” News Deeply, January 16, 2018, https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/
articles/2018/01/16/analysis-division-defines-syrias-tribes-and-clans.
17 Oliver Holmes and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Islamic State Executed 700 People from Syrian Tribe: Monitoring Group,” Reuters, August 
16, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-execution/islamic-state-executed-700-people-from-syrian-tribe-monitoring-
group-idUSKBN0GG0H120140817. 
18 Larger tribes present in eastern Syria extend across state boundaries into Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and large numbers of Syrian 
“tribals” hold Saudi passports, though figures on this phenomenon are not known.
19 Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur, Eastern Expectations: The Changing Dynamics in Syria’s Tribal Regions (Riad El Solh, Lebanon: 
Carnegie Middle East Center, 2017), http://carnegie-mec.org/2017/02/28/eastern-expectations-changing-dynamics-in-syria-s-tribal-
regions-pub-68008. See also Nicholas Heras, Bassam Barabandi, and Nidal Betare, Deir Azzour Tribal Mapping Project (Washington, 
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-DAMaps-DoSProof.
pdf?mtime=20170929135935.
organized, joined protests, and experienced regime vi-
olence, loyalist-opposition splits within tribal networks 
extended eastward—and became more pronounced. 
The appearance of ISIS dramatically, and violently, 
exacerbated these divisions. ISIS demanded the alle-
giance of Syrian tribes, and recruited actively among 
young men in Raqqa and Deir Ezzour provinces. 
Resistance was met by extraordinary brutality, includ-
ing the mass murder of some seven hundred mem-
bers of the al-Sheitat tribe in Deir Ezzour in August 
2014 (replicating a tactic used to quash tribal resis-
tance in Iraq).17 Yet, ISIS found adherents within eastern 
tribes, including among men who had been exposed 
to Salafist variants of Islam through labor migration to 
Saudi Arabia.18 Those members of tribes who joined the 
Islamic State and survived the military operations of 
the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS have largely 
been repudiated by tribal leaders. Yet, the strains and 
suspicion resulting from the ISIS period linger, corrod-
ing kinship bonds and contributing to the ability of ISIS 
to regroup in the former territory of the Caliphate.19
The onset of armed conflict, and the later rise of ISIS 
in the Jazirah region, also fueled longstanding tensions 
between Arabs and Kurds, but in forms that reflected 
the impact of Syria’s uprising in generating new alli-
ances and enmities. Kurdish political actors, notably, 
the PYD and the far weaker Kurdish National Council 
(KNC), occupied an ambivalent position in the Syrian 
uprising. Neither the opposition, dominated by Arab 
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nationalists, nor the Assad regime fully trusted either 
group. Turkey, a key backer of the opposition, viewed 
the PYD as a threat to its national security. Though the 
KNC was more willing to publicly align itself with the 
opposition and declared its support for Syrian unity, 
both mainstream Syrian opposition groups and the 
Assad regime continued to view the Kurds as suspect 
and unreliable, harboring irredentist ambitions, and 
pragmatic to a fault in their defense of Kurdish inter-
ests. The mid-2012 establishment of a nominally au-
tonomous Kurdish zone in northeastern Syria, Rojava 
(later renamed the Democratic Federation of Northern 
Syria), reinforced these perceptions.
These tensions were evident throughout the uprising, and 
have weighed heavily in shaping Kurdish-Arab relations in 
US areas of operation in eastern Syria. During the initial 
phases of armed conflict, for example, pro-regime Arab 
tribal militias attacked Kurdish towns along the Turkish 
border, and joined in clashes targeting PYD positions 
in Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Aleppo.20 In this 
period, opposition armed groups regularly cooperated 
with Kurdish militias to confront the regime. However, as 
opposition militias radicalized and jihadi groups came to 
dominate the armed opposition, relations with Kurdish 
militias became strained, at times deteriorating into vi-
olence.21 As ISIS seized territory in Syria and worked to 
extend areas under its control from mid-2014 onward, 
Kurdish villages along Syria’s northeastern border with 
Turkey became principal targets. ISIS captured some 
three hundred and fifty Kurdish-majority villages by fall 
2014, before it was defeated in the battle of Kobani/Ayn 
al-Arab in early 2015 by Kurdish fighters supported by the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the US Air Force. The battle 
of Kobani marked one of the last major confrontations 
in which Kurdish and Arab armed groups collaborated. 
The arrival of US forces in 2015 affected every vector 
of Kurdish politics, with significant implications for US 
stabilization programs. The decision to rely on PYD-
affiliated Kurdish fighters to develop a US-backed, local 
anti-ISIS militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 
20 Nicholas A. Heras and Carole A. O’Leary, “The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria,” Jamestown 
Foundation Terrorism Monitor vol. 11, no. 13, June 2013, https://jamestown.org/program/the-tribal-factor-in-syrias-rebellion-a-survey-of-
armed-tribal-groups-in-syria/.
21 Pascal Andersen, “Friends or Foes? A Closer Look on Relations Between YPG and the Regime,” Belling Cat, September 12, 2016, https://
www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/09/12/friend-or-foes-ypg-regime/. 
22 Bedir Mulla Rashid, Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria (Istanbul: Omran for Strategic Studies, 
2018), http://omranstudies.org/publications/reports/military-and-security-structures-of-the-autonomous-administration-in-syria.html. 
23 Daniel Wilkofsky and Khalid Fatah, “Northern Syria’s Anti-Islamic State Coalition Has an Arab Problem,” War On The Rocks, September 
17, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/northern-syrias-anti-islamic-state-coalition-has-an-arab-problem/. 
24 Bethan McKernan, “US-backed Kurdish Forces Face Accusations of Abuse Amid ISIS Liberation Campaign,” Independent, May 30, 2017, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-kurds-isis-fight-for-raqqa-sunni-arabs-accusations-abuse-detentions-
arrests-internment-a7763956.html. 
25 Roy Gutman, “Have the Syrian Kurds Committed War Crimes?” Nation, February 7, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/have-the-
syrian-kurds-committed-war-crimes/. 
and to delegate authority over local governance to 
the SDF in areas retaken from ISIS, reconfigured the 
balance of power between Kurds and Arabs.22 Kurdish 
forces are now the de facto ruling authority in Arab-
majority areas in which Kurds have not historically been 
present, including Raqqa city and eastern Deir Ezzour.23 
Aggravating an already-fragile situation, SDF command-
ers have often been heavy-handed in their approach to 
local governance. Against the opposition of local com-
munities, they have imposed measures to empower 
the PYD. In Raqqa and its surroundings, the SDF has 
restricted freedom of expression, used force to break 
up protests against SDF authorities, and transferred the 
legal jurisdiction of Arab villages to Kurdish areas. It has 
also been accused of forced conscription of Arab youth 
into the SDF, as well as arbitrary detentions and the abu-
sive treatment of detainees in areas under its control.24 
International human-rights organizations and commu-
nity activists in Arab-majority areas have charged the 
SDF and PYD with ethnic cleansing in a campaign to 
transform the demographic balance of mixed Kurdish-
Arab areas—charges the PYD has denied.25 While US 
forces have tried to alleviate local conflicts caused by 
SDF practices, its narrowly defined approach to stabili-
zation leaves the United States poorly equipped to offer 
more than ad hoc interventions on a case-by-case basis.
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The success of the US-led anti-ISIS campaign has thus 
transformed the political landscape of eastern Syria, 
amplifying frictions between US-backed militias and 
local communities, and generating conflicts that both 
Arabs and Kurds typically frame in terms of longstand-
ing ethnic hostility. Yet, the United States, resistant to 
undertaking activities that might be seen as support 
for reconstruction or engaging in nation building, 
has largely avoided responding to the political con-
sequences of its anti-ISIS campaign. Nor has it used 
its presence in the Jazirah to support the emergence 
of political institutions that local, Arab-majority com-
munities view as legitimate and effective. Instead, the 
United States implements stabilization programs that 
focus on urgent, short-term, basic needs, while encour-
aging the development of political frameworks that do 
little to address local concerns about the intentions of 
the SDF and the PYD. The mantra of “by, with, and 
through” has become a catch-all justification of a di-
vision of labor in which the United States cedes local 
governance to the SDF, which it then works through to 
manage its field-based programming. As a result, while 
the United States claims that its approach is intended 
to avoid dictating political outcomes, it is, in fact, com-
plicit in the destabilization of local politics throughout 
its areas of operation. 
The experience of governance in Raqqa, the largest city 
in eastern Syria and site of one of the fiercest and most 
destructive battles in the anti-ISIS campaign, is a case 
in point. Even before the defeat of ISIS in October 2017, 
the SDF began to put in place a post-ISIS governance 
structure for the city, based on “Self-Administration” 
models used by the PYD to govern areas under its 
control. The SDF, working as an extension of the PYD, 
established a political wing, the Syrian Democratic 
Council (SDC), to organize a Raqqa civil council that 
included representation from the city’s Arab-majority 
population, jointly headed by an Arab and a Kurdish 
representative.26 The local council was nominally de-
signed as an expression of the SDC’s commitment 
to democratic decentralization, yet operates to con-
solidate the authority of the SDF’s armed wing and, 
eventually, bring Raqqa city under the direct author-
ity of the YPG as part of its federal system. According 
26 The website of the civil council is hosted by the Syrian Democratic Forces: https://sdf-press.com/en/tag/al-raqqa-civil-council/. 
27 Haid, “The Ramifications of the SDF Governance Plan for Raqqa Post-ISIS,” Syria Source (blog), Atlantic Council, May 11, 2017, http://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-ramifications-of-the-sdf-governance-plan-for-raqqa-post-isis; see also Haid Haid, “Is the 
Raqqa Civilian Council Fit for Purpose?” Chatham House, October 2017, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/is-the-raqqa-civilian-
council-fit-for-purpose.
28 Fighting ISIS: The Road to and Beyond Raqqa, Middle East briefing no. 53 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017), https://www.
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/b053-fighting-isis-road-and-beyond-raqqa. 
29 “U.S.-Backed Forces Announce Three-Day Curfew in Raqqa City,” Reuters, June 24, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-raqqa/us-backed-forces-announce-three-day-curfew-in-raqqa-city-idUSKBN1JK092. 
30 Aris Rouissinos, “Raqqa Residents Blame the U.S. for Neglecting the City’s Recovery,” Vice, July 19, 2018, https://news.vice.com/en_us/
article/8xbqx3/raqqa-residents-blame-the-us-for-neglecting-the-citys-recovery. 
to a leading analyst, “[t]he SDF sponsored model for 
Raqqa aims to ensure their control over the territories 
they capture from ISIS as a first step to integrating it 
in the Self-Administration project.”27 According to the 
International Crisis Group: 
“Efforts by the YPG (and its Self-Admin-
istration) to achieve Arab buy-in to its proj-
ect have been partial and haphazard and do 
not amount to a meaningful share in gover-
nance. Official rhetoric signals inclusiveness 
and pluralism, but YPG flags and posters of 
[imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah] Öcalan 
adorn streets and town squares (including 
in majority-Arab areas) in a manner typical 
of autocratic, single-party rule elsewhere in 
the region. Arab figures willing to partici-
pate in the Self-Administration are handed 
impressive titles but no real authority…
ultimate power of decision rests with the 
Qandil-trained PKK cadres. Beyond that, 
these institutions are limited to the distribu-
tion of meagre services that are unlikely to 
purchase the loyalty of otherwise skeptical 
citizens.”28
Not surprisingly, Raqqa’s Arab majority has chafed 
under the authority of the SDF-SDC and been vocal 
in its opposition. In May 2018, local Arab activists or-
ganized protests that were violently suppressed by 
the SDF. In June, the SDF imposed a brief curfew and 
declared a temporary state of emergency in Raqqa, 
alleging that ISIS militants were seeking to reenter the 
city—a threat many residents viewed as a cover-up for 
a political crackdown to suppress dissent.29 Arab resi-
dents have also expressed anger at the United States 
for the slow pace of reconstruction, and the perceived 
lack of US action regarding governance failures and the 
conduct of the SDF.30
Raqqa’s experience is far from unique. Similar gover-
nance arrangements, and similar narratives of local 
pushback and resistance, are also evident in SDF-
controlled areas of Deir Ezzour, the largest city in 
eastern Syria, and in other Arab-majority towns and 
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villages that US-backed militias have freed from ISIS 
control.31 US commanders in the field are not unaware 
of these effects, and have taken measures to mitigate 
them, including efforts to develop local councils that 
more accurately reflect the demographic composition 
of Arab-majority areas. Such efforts, however, have not 
been adequate to address local concerns, or to check 
the SDF’s determination to deepen its control within 
its areas of operation. Most recently, on September 6, 
2018, the SDF-backed Syrian Democratic Council an-
nounced the formation of a region-wide governance 
body, the “Autonomous Administration of North and 
East Syria,” to coordinate among local councils in the 
SDF’s areas of operation.32 These councils have not 
been tightly linked to coherent stabilization programs 
that have a goal of “supporting locally legitimate au-
thorities and systems to peaceably manage conflict 
and prevent violence,” as recommended by the SAR.33 
Instead, the current US approach to stabilization, in 
which the doctrine of “by, with, and through” privileges 
the SDF, contributes to conditions that make conflict 
and violence more likely, undermines efforts to prevent 
31 Rodi Said, “U.S. Allied Syrian Groups Form Civilian Council to Run Deir al-Zor,” Reuters, September 24, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-deir-zor/u-s-allied-syrian-groups-form-civilian-council-to-run-deir-al-zor-idUSKCN1BZ0F6. 
32 Ragip Soylu, “YPG Suspends Oil Deals with Assad Regime as US Sanctions Iran-tied Middlemen,” Daily Sabah, September 7, 2018, 
https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2018/09/07/ypg-suspends-oil-deals-with-assad-regime-as-us-sanctions-iran-tied-middlemen. 
33 US Department of State, et al., “Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government 
Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas.”
the resurgence of ISIS, fuels grievances among local 
communities, and undercuts the impact and potential 
effectiveness of topline US diplomacy. 
If longstanding ethnic tensions between Arabs and 
Kurds weigh heavily on the stability and security of 
opposition-held eastern Syria, stabilization efforts must 
contend with a second, equally daunting, factor: the 
shadow of the future. Simply put, the greater the un-
certainty among local actors about the US commit-
ment to its presence in eastern Syria, the weaker the 
incentives to take US interests into account, to engage 
with the United States, or to invest in US-backed initia-
tives. Despite statements from newly appointed Syria 
envoy James Jeffrey affirming the United States’ intent 
to keep troops in Syria as long as necessary, there re-
mains widespread doubt about the credibility of the 
United States among both US-backed Kurdish forces 
and local Arab residents. Confidence in the stability 
of US policy under President Trump is low; his deci-
sion to eliminate State Department funding for stabi-
lization operations in both eastern and northwestern 
The third session meeting of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) is held in Tabqa, Syria July 16, 2018. Credit: REUTERS/Rodi Said
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Syria amplified these doubts. Nor has the replacement 
of US funding by contributions from Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and EU members of the anti-ISIS 
coalition done much to alter local perceptions. 
Such perceptions create powerful incentives for local 
actors to limit their cooperation, treat the US not as a 
“partner” but as a transactional actor to be exploited, 
and invest instead in positioning themselves to sur-
vive the inevitable return of the Assad regime. And, to 
the extent that US-backed stabilization operations are 
seen as focused solely on short-term counterterrorism; 
having empowered Kurdish militias; and indifferent to 
the development of legitimate political institutions, the 
incentives to look beyond the United States and the 
SDF for security will increase. The strategic calculus of 
US-backed Kurdish forces, and other Kurdish actors, 
reflects their distinctive concerns and priorities, but is 
also driven by a lack of clarity about the duration of 
the US presence, the limited scope of US stabilization 
operations, and clear signals that the United States ex-
pects the Assad regime to regain control over eastern 
and northeastern Syria. 
The stakes for both Arab residents and the SDF are 
high, and the incentives to adjust in anticipation of the 
34 Seth J. Frantzman, “Syrian Regime Cracks Down on Former Rebel Areas Near Golan,” Jerusalem Post, August 26, 2018, https://www.
jpost.com/Middle-East/Syrian-regime-cracks-down-on-former-rebel-areas-near-Golan-565788. 
35 Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady, “Syria’s Reconciliation Agreements,” Syria Studies vol. 9, no. 2, 2017, pp. 1–14, https://ojs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/index; see also Fadi Adleh and Agnès Favier, “’Local Reconciliation Agreements’ in Syria: A Non-Starter 
for Peacebuilding,” Middle East Directions Research Project Report (June 2017), http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/46864.
36 According to opposition media sources, more than one hundred and forty “reconciled” former opposition fighters died “in mysterious 
circumstances” after being summoned by the regime for possible deployment to Idlib. See “140 Individuals from the ‘Reconciled’ 
Opposition Die Under Mysterious Circumstances…And the Syrian Regime is Accused of Liquidating Them,” Nida` Suriyya, September 
15, 2018, http://nedaa-sy.com/news/8419. 
regime’s likely return are compelling. Other areas that 
have been outside the regime’s control for extended 
periods have fared poorly following its return. Regime 
authorities have consistently violated pledges made in 
the course of negotiations with local councils in oppo-
sition-held areas, looking to preserve some measure of 
local governance and protect those who were not active 
participants in opposition armed groups. The regime has 
given an ominously Orwellian twist to the terms of sur-
render it imposes on the communities it has defeated, 
designating them as “reconciliation agreements.” Yet, it 
has failed to abide by even the harsh terms such agree-
ments contain.34 According to one assessment: 
“The reconciliations were regarded from 
the very beginning as part of a war strat-
egy rather than a genuine desire to move 
toward power-sharing: promises pertaining 
to administrative decentralization and the 
special privileges promised to notables of 
reconciled areas were reversed over time 
and loyalists were systematically reintro-
duced into these areas.”35
Residents of eastern Syria are well aware of these ex-
periences, and the likely fate of those who “surrender” 
to the Assad regime.36 They understand the benefit of 
moving early to strike a deal with the regime, rather 
than endure extended sieges and their consequences. 
In eastern Syria, moreover, the fragmentation of tribes, 
splits between opposition supporters and loyalists, 
the erosion of the authority of tribal elders, lingering 
grievances among those who suffered under ISIS, and 
resentment over the marginalization of Arab notables 
by the SDF have compounded the uncertainties sur-
rounding the aftermath of a US withdrawal. 
Depending on how reintegration unfolds, any number of 
these vectors could drive significant violence, including 
the possible splintering of the SDF along ethnic lines. 
If the PYD and SDF negotiate some form of decentral-
ization, will it include Arab-majority areas along the 
Euphrates? If so, how would Arab communities respond? 
If negotiations fail, however, and the regime moves to 
retake the northeast by force, the Jazirah will become a 
battlefield, and will likely experience the levels of violence 
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the regime and its allies have meted out to other oppo-
sition-held areas. Conflict in the northeast is likely to be 
especially intense, given the skill and experience of YPG-
SDF fighters. Under these conditions, it is also likely that 
conflicts will occur between pro-regime and pro-opposi-
tion tribal factions. For the time being, the US presence 
serves as a deterrent to military action by the regime. Yet, 
this deterrent effect can also be expected to degrade 
over time, without a clear and unequivocal commitment 
from the United States to keep its forces in Syria.
Not surprisingly, both Arabs and Kurds have taken steps 
to protect their interests, given the lack of US commit-
ment, credibility, and engagement. Both treat their ties 
to US forces and their role in support of US policy as 
short-term, with declining payoffs, and therefore ex-
pendable. With both groups, there is growing evidence 
of a willingness to defect from the United States and 
37 Mohammad Bassiki, “Syria’s Assad Seeks Support of Tribes Against US, Others,” Al-Monitor, July 11, 2018, http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2018/07/syria-arab-tribes-us-foreign-presence-kurds.html#ixzz5QzhJMuDI. On regime efforts to split tribal and Kurdish 
forces from the United States, see also Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, “Pay as You Stay: Here’s What the Trump Administration Is 
Really Plotting in Syria,” Daily Beast, April 3, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-trump-serious-about-syria-do-we-stay-do-we-go-
and-who-pays. 
shift allegiances to the Assad regime. In turn, and no 
less predictably, the Assad regime has also read the tea 
leaves and redoubled its efforts to widen breaches be-
tween the United States, the SDF-PYD, and tribal elites 
in eastern Syria. As the regime continues to gain ground 
and retake areas held by the opposition, these efforts 
have been increasingly successful. In early June 2018, 
as the regime, Russia, and Iran prepared an offensive 
against opposition-held areas of southern Syria, some 
seventy “Syrian tribal members and leaders in Deir 
Hafer city, in northern Aleppo province, announced 
they were forming a force called the Popular Tribal 
Resistance Units…to ‘resist the US, French and Turkish 
presence in eastern Syria and reject any presence or 
intervention of military forces of any state on Syrian soil 
without the government’s approval and coordination.’”37 
One month later, with Deraa in government hands, tribal 
leaders from Aleppo province confirmed their support 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) celebrate the first anniversary of Raqqa province liberation from ISIS, in Raqqa, Syria October 27, 
2018. Credit: REUTERS/Aboud Hamam
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“for the army in its war on terrorism,” and their resis-
tance to US and other foreign forces in eastern Syria.38
Regime advances and concerns about the reliability 
of the United States have also led Kurdish groups to 
explore prospects for some form of accommodation 
with the Assad regime, both to secure the gains they 
have achieved since 2011 and to enlist the regime’s 
protection against threats from Turkey.39 For its part, 
the regime has been responsive to such talks. Kurdish 
regime loyalists have encouraged their counterparts 
in the northeast to accept the inevitability of a US 
withdrawal, and to recognize that a return to the re-
gime’s fold is their only option.40 In late July 2018, 
Russia facilitated a meeting in Damascus between a 
YPG delegation and a senior regime security official, 
Ali Mamlouk, to discuss the terms of a possible nego-
tiation.41 A second meeting followed shortly thereafter. 
As of late 2018, these exchanges on the future status of 
the YPG-led “Democratic Autonomous Administration” 
have yielded little, and the likelihood of an imminent 
agreement is remote. Yet, both sides appear commit-
ted to continuing negotiations. Moreover, there are in-
dications that US officials have tacitly encouraged the 
SDF to come to terms with the Assad regime, reinforc-
ing Kurdish perceptions that, whatever might be said in 
Washington, the United States remains committed to a 
withdrawal from Syria in the near term.42 
These machinations by local actors have not yet com-
promised anti-ISIS operations. In mid-September 2018, 
the SDF, with support from US forces, began attacks 
to clear the few remaining pockets controlled by ISIS 
in eastern Syria. The SDF remains dependent on the 
United States, yet its potential to affect counterterror-
ism operations and undermine topline US diplomacy 
was on vivid display earlier in the year. In July, following 
38 “Tribes and Clans of Aleppo and its Countryside Confirm Their Support for the Army in Its War on Terrorism,” Syrian Arab News 
Agency, July 7, 2018, https://www.sana.sy/?p=778868. 
39 Apart from discussions over the future status of Kurdish-controlled areas, the Assad regime and the YPG have maintained connections 
and economic ties throughout Syria’s conflict. See Sam Hamad, “YPG and Assad: Pragmatic Allies but Unwilling Bedfellows?” New Arab, 
August 26, 2016, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/8/26/ypg-and-assad-pragmatic-allies-but-unwilling-bedfellows. 
40 Helbast Shekhani, “Syrian MP Says US to Leave Syria Soon, Kurds Should Return to Government,” Kurdistan 24, July 31, 2018, http://
www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/3f14cd6f-9309-48c6-b566-a5d22143e977. See also Hannah Lynch, “Dealing in Damascus: Rojava Kurds 
Consider Pact with Assad,” Rudaw, July 28, 2018, http://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/28072018.
41 Haid Haid, Will the Syrian Government Strike a Deal with the Kurds?” Middle East Eye, August 1, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/
columns/will-syrian-regime-strike-deal-kurds-1019797361. 
42 Ibrahim Hamidi, “Kurds Prioritize Public Services in Pilot Talks with Damascus Regime,” Asharq Al-Awsat, July 28, 2018, https://aawsat.
com/english/home/article/1345901/kurds-prioritize-public-services-pilot-talks-damascus-regime. See also Aaron Stein, “The SDF’s 
Post-American Future: Why the Syrian Kurds Must Make a Deal with Assad,” Foreign Policy, August 31, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/syria/2018-08-31/sdfs-post-american-future. 
43 Martin Chulov and Mohammed Rasool, “Aggrieved Kurdish Fighters Quietly Join Syrian Regime Side in Battle for Idlib,” Guardian, 
September 7, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/07/kurds-renew-their-claim-for-idlib-as-final-battle-draws-near. 
44 Helbast Shekhani, “Kurdish Leader Reveals Details of First Meeting with Syrian Government,” Kurdistan 24, July 30, 2018, http://www.
kurdistan24.net/en/news/54d92d6a-2f82-457f-a8da-5b5b579ef70c. 
45 “The Kurdish Protection Will Not Participate in the Battle for Idlib…The Eye Is On Afrin,”Al-Arabiyya, September 16, 2018, https://www.
alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/syria/2018/09/16/الحماية-الكردية-لن-تشارك-بمعركة-إدلب-العين-على-عفرين.html
its defeat of insurgent armed groups in southern Syria, 
the Assad regime began positioning forces for an of-
fensive against opposition-held Idlib province. Even 
as warnings from the Trump administration and other 
Western governments against such an incursion es-
calated, Kurdish officials and SDF leaders announced 
their willingness to fight alongside the regime, in the 
hope of evicting Turkish forces and their Syrian proxies 
in the Free Syrian Army (FSA) from the Kurdish city of 
Afrin.43 Salih Muslim, former co-chair of the PYD, told 
reporters in late July: “Fighting in Idlib or Afrin is our 
duty and responsibility, and when we fight in Idlib, it 
will be our decision as we are not tools in the hands of 
others.”44 Subsequently, PYD leaders backed away from 
this position.45 Yet, in effect, the leading US-backed mili-
tia in the anti-ISIS coalition had announced its intent to 
work against US efforts to prevent a regime offensive in 
northwest Syria, undermining US diplomacy. Awkward 
at best, the PYD’s position could lead to the diversion 
of Kurdish fighters from eastern Syria, hampering op-
erations against ISIS—a possible repeat of events of 
January 2018, when a Turkish operation to push Kurdish 
forces out of Afrin drew SDF fighters away from the anti- 
ISIS coalition in the east. This ongoing dance between 
“ The SDF remains dependent 
on the United States, 
yet its potential to affect 
counterterrorism operations 
and undermine topline US 
diplomacy was on vivid display 
earlier in the year.”
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the PYD and the regime does not mean that accom-
modation is inevitable: significant differences between 
the two remain.46 Yet, as it develops, and as uncertainty 
about US intentions drags on, the pressure on the PYD 
to align with the regime will only grow.
Stabilization, Governance, and Human Security
To point out shortcomings in the current US approach 
to stabilization does not imply a 180-degree shift in an 
opposite direction. The limitations and constraints that 
have shaped the current approach cannot simply be 
dismissed—nor should they be. It is appropriate to view 
the US troop presence in Syria as a relatively short-
term commitment. US forces should be withdrawn 
within a reasonable, but not precipitous, timeframe. It 
is correct to acknowledge that the United States can-
not resolve deep social, ethnic, and tribal tensions in 
the Jazirah. Nor should its use its presence in Syria 
46 Occasionally, these differences lead to violence between the regime and Kurdish forces, which both usually work to avoid. For example, 
on September 8, 2018, clashes in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli between regime forces and the Kurdish internal security force, 
the Asayish, killed eleven and wounded many more. Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “YPG to Investigate Clash with Regime that Killed 11,” 
Kurdistan 24, September 15, 2018, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/6f12b30d-052b-4299-b4af-ba39e29188a6.
to pursue a policy of partition; the future reintegra-
tion of the northeast and east provinces into a unitary 
Syrian state should continue to guide US assumptions 
about the longer-term political future of the country. 
Moreover, as earlier stabilization and reconstruction ex-
periences have taught, it is important to keep expecta-
tions in check. Too often, grandiose goals are attached 
to stabilization programs that are poorly funded, thinly 
staffed, and structurally incapable of achieving their 
purported aims.
These constraints are not trivial. At present, however, 
they have led to a stabilization strategy that is not 
only counterproductive to the larger goals of US pol-
icy, but also contributes to conditions on the ground 
that increase the prospects of future conflicts, and 
future waves of radicalization. More effectively align-
ing stabilization operations in Syria with US policy, 
and helping shape local conditions that hold greater 
Members of the US Army 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) conduct 50. Caliber weapons training during counter-ISIS 
operations in Syria, Nov. 22, 2017. Credit: US Army/Staff Sgt. Jacob Connor
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promise of long-term stability, will require rethinking 
the underlying assumptions on which current prac-
tices are based. These include not only the timetable 
for a US withdrawal, but how stabilization is concep-
tualized and implemented. 
As noted above, the first step toward this end is straight-
forward: US forces should simply apply current US stabi-
lization doctrine to Syria, and prioritize the development 
of locally legitimate political authorities capable of pro-
viding effective governance and maintaining security. 
This shift will have more impact, however, if stabiliza-
tion efforts are designed with a focus on strengthening 
human security in US areas of operations. Linking stabili-
zation to human security is not new. The US government 
has integrated the two in other conflict zones, including 
Afghanistan and Bosnia. Yet, such a focus would require 
substantive shifts in the design and funding of field-
based programs. Most important, this shift would recog-
nize that, under the Assad regime, state institutions will 
continue to pose the most significant threat to the secu-
rity of civilian populations, especially in areas that have 
been outside its control for a significant time. 
Confirming the findings of the 2009 Arab Human 
Development Report on human security, Syria is a case 
par excellence, in which “factors such as weak institu-
tional curbs on state power; a fragile and fragmented civil 
society; dysfunctional elected assemblies, both national 
and local; and disproportionately powerful security appa-
ratuses often combine to turn the state into a menace to 
human security, rather than its chief supporter.”47 Seven 
years of violent conflict have only exacerbated these 
conditions.48 The regime’s conduct in areas it has retaken 
since 2015 offers ample empirical evidence that, for the 
vast majority of Syrians, the state does not, and cannot, 
function as the “chief supporter of human security.”49 
Current US stabilization policy does little to address the 
threat of future repression by the Assad regime. This 
need not be the case. Indeed, the most effective way to 
align Syria stabilization with current doctrine, and link 
it more tightly to a broader strategy, is to make use of 
the US presence to offset or mitigate the Assad regime’s 
capacity to threaten human security in eastern Syria. 
In practical terms, this requires an approach that pri-
oritizes efforts to equip local communities, both Arab 
and Kurdish, to shape the terms on which the Assad 
regime reimposes its authority. This, in turn, requires a 
47 UNDP, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in Arab Countries (New 
York: UNDP, 2009), p. 53, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/arab_human_developmentreport2009.html. 
48 Steven Heydemann, “Tracking the ‘Arab Spring’: Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy vol. 24, no. 4, October 
2013, pp. 59-73, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/tracking-arab-spring-syria-and-future-authoritarianism.
49 Steven Heydemann, Beyond Fragility: Fierce States and the Challenge of Reconstruction in Syria (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-fragility-syria-and-the-challenges-of-reconstruction-in-fierce-states/. 
greater degree of flexibility in how the United States op-
erationalizes its “by, with, and through” approach to sta-
bilization to be more inclusive of a wide range of local 
actors, shrink the role of the SDF in local governance in 
Arab-majority areas, support the development of rep-
resentative, legitimate, and effective local-governance 
institutions, and encourage the development of local 
balance-of-power arrangements that will generate in-
centives for the Assad regime to accept some measure 
of local autonomy. In effect, this means extending to 
Arab communities in eastern Syria the opportunity to 
negotiate reintegration that is now available only to the 
PYD. Such an approach does not put the United States 
in the position of dictating political outcomes. Rather, it 
creates at least the possibility for local actors to have a 
hand in shaping their own political outcomes.
To the extent that this does not occur—that possibili-
ties for a negotiated accommodation with the regime 
are monopolized and controlled by the PYD-SDF, and 
exclude meaningful Arab participation—the more likely 
it becomes that the reimposition of regime authority 
will be accompanied by violence, instability, the resur-
gence of radicalism, and the continued erosion of the 
US ability to affect the closing trajectory of the Syrian 
conflict. If this is done without addressing demands 
for effective local governance among Arab residents of 
the Jazirah—and without compromising similar Kurdish 
demands—it becomes more likely that the return of 
the Syrian state will bring with it the renewal of the 
coercive, abusive practices that define the Assad re-
gime’s treatment of its own citizens. The likelihood of 
these outcomes increases so long as the United States 
is unwilling to directly fund, and adequately support, 
stabilization programs with an expanded mandate that 
includes a systematic focus on local governance. 
Therefore, the United States needs to make clear, first 
and foremost, that while it remains committed to the 
SDF as a partner in the anti-ISIS campaign, it intends 
to support the development of autonomous local 
“ Current US stabilization policy 
does little to address the threat 
of future repression by the 
Assad regime.”
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governance in Arab-majority areas that have never 
been under Kurdish authority. To achieve this, the 
SDF will need to devolve local authority to known and 
trusted community representatives, who will assume re-
sponsibility for governance, including stabilization and 
reconstruction programs, policing, and the oversight of 
justice institutions. Nothing about this will be easy. It 
will require building a stabilization effort that supports 
the development of reconfigured local administrations, 
local police, and local justice institutions. It will require 
strengthening coordination and cooperation between 
local administrations and their civil-society counter-
parts. It will inevitably affect, and could disrupt, delicate 
local balances of power. Its implementation must be 
mindful of the many rivalries and factional differences 
that might upend an expanded stabilization program.
However, the most immediate challenge to devolution 
within US areas of operation is a decision by the SDF 
in mid-September 2018, seemingly with US support, 
to impose a layer of regional governance, the General 
Council of Self-Administration in Northern and Eastern 
Syria, to coordinate the local councils it created in the 
areas from Manbij in the northwest into Deir Ezzour 
in the east. For the first time, the provinces of Raqqa 
and Deir Ezzour have been included in the PYD-led 
Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.50 The scope 
of SDF-PYD ambition is clear: to create a single, unified, 
Kurdish-ruled zone that is nominally independent of 
Damascus, mirroring the status of the Kurdish Regional 
50 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “New Administration Formed for Northeastern Syria,” Kurdistan 24, September 6, 2018, http://www.
kurdistan24.net/en/news/c9e03dab-6265-4a9a-91ee-ea8d2a93c657. 
51 Sardar Mlla Drwish, “Kurds Step Up Efforts to Form Self-Government in Northeast Syria,” Al-Monitor, September 18, 2018, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/09/syria-kurds-general-council-government.html#ixzz5RYzrY94e. 
52 Steven Heydemann, “Rules for Reconstruction in Syria,” Markaz (blog), Brookings, August 24, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
markaz/2017/08/24/rules-for-reconstruction-in-syria/. 
Government in Iraq. Farid Ati, Kurdish co-chair of the 
council, told journalists that the General Council will 
provide “the pillars of the government ruling in north-
eastern Syria, with its headquarters in Ain Issa. Thus, 
the new entity extracts power from two sources: a po-
litical one (the SDC) and a military one (SDF). They are 
allies, and the US and the international coalition back 
them in northeastern Syria.”51 
This initiative, imposed unilaterally by the SDF, rein-
forces Arab concerns about security, the political future 
of Arab-majority areas, and the reliability and credibility 
of the United States. It will amplify the kinds of griev-
ances that have previously fueled Arab-Kurdish tensions 
and contributed to radicalization within Arab communi-
ties in eastern Syria. It stands as an example of how the 
US mantra of operating “by, with, and through” local 
partners can undermine the effectiveness of topline US 
diplomacy. Therefore, rather than giving such moves 
their blessing, US commanders in eastern Syria need 
to expand the scope of their strategy, begin unravel-
ing the political structures created by the SDF, replace 
them with truly legitimate local councils, and deploy 
stabilization resources to equip local communities to 
have the best possible prospects for navigating their 
own political futures over the next three-to-five years. 
As the end phase of the anti-ISIS operation unfolds, this 
is an opportune moment to rethink the political role of 
the SDF in Arab-majority areas. 
Downgrading the political role of the SDF in eastern 
Syria carries risks. Yet, the potential benefits of an ex-
panded stabilization effort—focused on strengthening 
human security through improved local governance—
are significant. Such an approach to stabilization would 
provide for the emergence of locally legitimate gov-
ernance in Arab areas of eastern Syria. It would cre-
ate conditions in which civil-society institutions can 
develop to strengthen the accountability, responsive-
ness, and effectiveness of local authorities. It would 
also offer opportunities to improve the effectiveness 
of stabilization programs by linking them more closely 
to authorities best situated to identify and act on local 
priorities. Adopting an approach based on the “rules 
for reconstruction” that should guide US policy in re-
gime-held areas of Syria—go local, go small, and go 
around the Assad regime—offers some assurance that 
stabilization funds would not be allocated to wasteful, 
large-scale activities.52 
“ Adopting an approach 
based on the “rules for 
reconstruction” that should 
guide US policy in regime-held 
areas of Syria—go local, go 
small, and go around the Assad 
regime—offers some assurance 
that stabilization funds would 
not be allocated to wasteful, 
large-scale activities.”
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By pursuing such an approach, the United States would 
also be advancing its topline diplomatic aims. Properly 
funded, stabilization efforts could provide local author-
ities in the Jazirah with resources to improve basic in-
frastructure, address urgent humanitarian needs, and 
alleviate conditions that are associated with radicaliza-
tion. Doing so would both enhance the legitimacy of 
local authorities and give communities a stake in pre-
venting the resurgence of ISIS, or its replacement by 
other violent extremist organizations. Empowering local 
governance would also offer residents in Arab-majority 
areas an alternative to the Assad regime as a means to 
defend local interests from Kurdish authorities that are 
widely viewed as illegitimate. Further, a focus on human 
security through effective local governance would also 
advance US efforts to achieve an irreversible political 
transition, by lending weight to bottom-up processes 
of political decentralization in eastern Syria similar to, if 
more modest than, those currently in place in Kurdish-
majority areas of the northeast. Without dictating politi-
cal outcomes, the United States would be contributing to 
conditions that could give local authorities a measure of 
leverage in shaping the political future of eastern Syria.
Why would any of these efforts hold once the regime 
sets its sights on retaking the east? They might not. 
The possibility of failure is real, as it is with regard to 
the PYD’s efforts to consolidate its authority in the 
northeast. Yet, the regime’s conduct over the past 
seven years provides ample evidence of its willing-
ness to bargain with local authorities to avoid the 
need to retake contested areas by force. To be sure, 
the regime routinely violates the agreements that re-
sult from such negotiations. However, if US stabiliza-
tion work has been successful, the regime will have 
a chance to lower the political and financial costs of 
reintegrating the east, and local residents will have 
greater resources they can bring to bear to manage 
reintegration more effectively than was the case in 
communities that experienced brutal (and illegal 
under international law) starvation sieges. What the 
regime wants from eastern Syria, first and foremost, 
is control over its oil resources and agricultural out-
put. If it can attain these, and reestablish its formal 
sovereignty, it may well conclude that local gover-
nance structures can be melded into its system of 
rule, rather than dismantled. There is a long history of 
accommodation and bargaining between the regime, 
the Baath Party, and local elites in eastern Syria; this 
has extended greater autonomy to local elites in the 
east than exists in more intensely centralized west-
ern provinces. This history suggests not to underesti-
mate the sustainability of local-governance initiatives 
backed by US stabilization programs.
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CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF 
STABILIZATION IN EASTERN SYRIA
As the focus of the Syrian conflict narrows to the two remaining contested areas of the country, the presence of US forces on the ground is drawing the United States closer 
to its center. If the United States has an interest in 
shaping the closing trajectory of the conflict, it has 
a narrow window in which to do so. In eastern Syria, 
the United States has an opportunity to use stabiliza-
tion to advance both short- and long-term interests. It 
can adopt a stabilization strategy that will improve the 
well-being of communities in eastern Syria, develop 
effective, legitimate local authorities, and assist local 
communities in preparing for an uncertain political 
future. By shifting its efforts to focus on the role of 
local governance in strengthening human security, the 
United States will bring its field-based operations into 
line with the recently established stabilization doctrine 
of the US government. It will also be in a position to 
improve the contribution of field-based programs to 
topline US diplomacy in Syria, and increase the likeli-
hood that the presence of US forces in Syria will both 
temper the possible resurgence of violent extremist 
groups and leave communities better positioned to 
manage their political futures once the United States 
withdraws. 
Exploiting these opportunities will not be easy. It will re-
quire the United States to engage more directly in local 
governance than it has to date, and oversee the devo-
lution of authority from the SDF and its local councils 
to bodies that are more fully representative of Arab-
majority communities. After more than two years in 
which the United States has worked largely “by, with, 
and through” the SDF, it will need to broaden and ex-
pand the scope of its stabilization operations, and renew 
connections and relationships with a broader range of 
local actors. Delegating local governance to the SDF 
has eased the burden the United States might other-
wise face in navigating the complex, and often opaque, 
politics of tribes, villages, and urban centers in eastern 
Syria. Yet, the hands-off, light-footprint approach comes 
at a price. As the United States works to achieve the 
three central aims that now seem to define its broader 
Syria policy—defeat ISIS, reduce Iran’s presence and in-
fluence, and achieve an irreversible political transition—
the costs of a narrowly defined stabilization strategy will 
only increase. Adjusting US policy to accommodate and 
fund a stabilization strategy based on support for locally 
legitimate governance could provide the United States 
with a more effective means for using its work on the 
ground to advance its core diplomatic aims. 
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